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PROFESSOR KURLAND, THE SUPREME COURT,
AND POLITICAL SCIENCE*
Donald P. Kommerst
IN

A

SYMPOSIUM held at the Notre Dame Law School on February 29,

1964, on several constitutional amendments designed to limit the power
of the Supreme Court,1 Professor Philip B. Kurland of the University of
Chicago Law School read a terse and delightfully witty paper in which he
compared the Supreme Court to Caesar, sieged on the one side by the
modem forces of Brutus, and championed on the other side by the contemporary Mark Antonys. 2 There was no doubt in Professor Kurland's
mind that the efforts of conspirators like the Council of State Governments,
not to mention its less respectable co-conspirators like the John Birch
Society, to circumscribe the Court's power and thus slay Caesar are going
wide of the mark. But he was convinced that the defenses of Antony are
equally harmful to Caesar. The irony is that while the indictment of Brutus
against Caesar mounts with each successive Term of Court, Antony's
apologies could actually push Caesar over the precipice into the pit of
destruction. For if Caesar is to survive his enemies as well as his friends he
might well be advised to look into his own soul and in a spirit of selfabnegation purge himself of whatever villainy he sees there.
If I may continue the Shakespearean analogy, Professor Kurland seems
to suggest that Caesar will go the route of Coriolanus, who destroyed himself from ambition, conceit, and self-righteousness, rather than be destroyed,
like Romeo, by external forces over which he has little control. And so
Professor Kurland joined in this instance with neither Brutus nor Antony,
but remained in the wings to await, sorrowfully, Caesar's self-destruction
or hopefully, his renascence. Professor Kurland's oration ended on this
note: "I find then that I have come neither to praise nor to bury Caesar. I
should only remind those who would destroy Caesar of the self-destruction
* I wish to thank Walter F. Murphy of Princeton University, Herbert Jacob
of the University of Wisconsin, and my colleague, Anton-Hermann Chroust, for their
helpful comments and criticism on an earlier draft of this paper.
t Assistant Professor of Government and International Studies, University of
Notre Dame.
I These amendments, proposed by the Council of State Governments, would
(1) vest the amendatory power in state legislatures to the exclusion of Congress,
(2) establish a "Court of the Union" with power to review judgments of the Supreme
Court relative to the rights of the states, and (3) deprive federal courts of jurisdiction over the field of legislative apportionment.
2Kurland, The Court of the Union or "Julius Caesar"Revised, 39 NoTRE DAME
LAW. 636 (1964).
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to which the noble Brutus was brought; nor can the Antonys among uswho would use Caesar for their own ends-rejoice at his ultimate fate.
For Caesar himself, I should borrow the advice given Cromwell by Wolsey:
'I charge thee, fling away ambition: By that sin fell the angels.' -3
But if at that moment Professor Kurland gave any appearance of neutrality as between Brutus and Antony, Caesar could only exclaim, "et tu
Philippe," following his sharp attack on Caesar in the "Foreword" to the
Harvard Law Review survey of the 1963 Term of the Supreme Court,
where he charged him with the commission of four deadly sins. 4 On the
basis of his evaluation of the 1963 Term he concludes that the Supreme
Court is: (1) directing an "egalitarian revolution in judicial doctrine" where
equality has become the chief guide to constitutional decision; (2) effectively subordinating, if not destroying, the federal system; (3) enlarging
the scope of judicial power beyond anything known before; and (4) ignoring the proper standards of craftsmanship in the drafting of written opinions.
Support for these generalizations is derived not only from certain 1963
Term decisions, 5 but also from what Professor Kurland regards as the
major jurisprudential thrust of the Warren Court since 1954 when it
decided the epochal Brown v. Board of Education.6
These decisions and the values they define constitute, according to Professor Kurland, unfortunate and illegitimate exertions of judicial power.
The reason is that the Court has somehow invaded the political realm, inculcating social and political values, whose allocation ought to be left to
Congress, state legislatures, executive officials, social processes, public
opinion, and intergroup dynamics. In short, the Supreme Court has been
acting like a bevy of impetuous politicians hellbent on transforming the
warp and woof of American society into a tapestry of new and bold designs.
In mounting his assault on Caesar, however, Professor Kurland was
much more cunning than Brutus. He knows that he cannot knife Caesar
with cold steel and get away with it; after all, as a brilliant student of the
Court he is committed to defending its institutional integrity, whatever the
nature of its particular output at any particular time. Rather, his weapon is
8 Id. at 643.

4 Kurland, Foreword: Equal in Origin and Equal in Title to the Legislative and
Executive Branches of the Government, 78 HIv.L. REv. 143 (1964).
5 See, e.g., Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964); Jackson v.
Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964); Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964); Jacobellis v.

Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964); Murphy v. Waterfront Conm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964);

Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); Lucas v. Forty-fourth Gen. Assembly, 377
U.S. 713 (1964); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon
Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324 (1964); Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S.
218 (1964); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar,
377 U.S. 1 (1964); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Wesberry
v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
0 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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that of biting wit. Woodrow Wilson is reputed to have said that "it is just as
hard to do your duty when men are sneering at you as when they are shooting at you." In the HarvardLaw Review essay Professor Kurland "sneers"
at the Court.
But he also casts a distrusting glance at political scientists. The following remark, partly the inspiration behind this article, is a summation of his
indictment:
The time has probably not yet come for an avowal that in the
field of public law, "judicial power" does not describe a different
function but only a different forum and that the subject of constitutional law should be turned back to the political scientists.
These students of political affairs realized, before lawyers did,
that the true measure of the Court's work is quantitative and not
qualitative. The Court will continue to play the role of the omniscient and strive toward omnipotence. And the law reviews will
continue to play the game of evaluating the Court's work in light
of the fictions of the law, legal reasoning, and legal history7 rather
than deal with the realities of politics and statesmanship.
Presumably, political scientists are more interested in the quantitative than
in the qualitative aspects of the Supreme Court's work, though it is difficult
to determine from this brief passage where irony leaves off and genuine
dismay or anger begins. Professor Kurland is obviously perturbed by the
absence on the Supreme Court of what he regards as the disciplined lawyer's
skill and temperament. Pervading his essay is the belief that good sociopolitical theory does not always make good constitutional law. Or, to put
it another way, constitutional law is not the pathway to the good society
any more than the Supreme Court is its fountainhead. The impression is
conveyed that this august tabernacle of law has somehow fallen into unconsecrated hands. At best, the Justices have momentarily forsaken their
priestly duties to assume the roles of political activist and social philosopher.
It is, of course, true that the legal scholar and the political scientist are
interested in different aspects of the Supreme Court-the former with logic
and doctrine, the latter with the process of decision. The political scientist
perceives the Court as an instrument for the resolution of political conflict,
while the lawyer perceives the Court as an enunciator of legal doctrine.
Both perceptions are probably needed for a full understanding of the Supreme Court as a corporate institution in the society. But the legal scholar
who seeks to range beyond logic and doctrine, as Professor Kurland does, to
define the broad limits of the Court's role in our society needs also to be
guided by the insights and capabilities of political science.
The impressive body of knowledge that the public law fraternity in
political science has accumulated as a result of modern methods of inquiry
7 Kurland, supra note 4, at 175.
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unfortunately has not been communicated to many of our colleagues on
law school faculties who write in the field of what Glendon Schubert has
called "constitutional politics." Rarely is this literature cited in the law
reviews, for as Professor Kurland notes, approvingly it would seem, they
continue "to play the game of evaluating the Court's work in light of the
fictions of the law, legal reasoning, and legal history rather than deal with
the realities of politics and statesmanship." 9 Yet few lawyers actually engage
in the hardheaded assessment of legal history for the purpose of determining, quantitatively if possible, the particular functions and contributions of
a given legal institution over a period of time as a basis for evaluating its
present role in society. One reason for this failure is that studies of the
Supreme Court by lawyers, and it must be added by some political scientists,
are marked by too much polemics, of which Professor Kurland's essay is
a prime example.
Currently, for example, a torrid debate rages among judicial activists,
passivists, neutralists, objectivists, and value-oriented apologists and critics
of the contemporary Court. We are, of course, entitled to our points of view,
and there are probably times when students of the Court should stand up
and be counted. In fact, I am not about to suggest here that some of Professor Kurland's criticisms are not well founded or that the Court might not
have exercised greater political prudence in handling some of the troublesome problems it faced in the 1963 Term. My own particular bias is for an
imaginatively liberal Court, steadfast in its defense of individual liberty and
an open society. Unlike Professor Kurland, I therefore take my stand with
the great liberal decisions of the Warren Court. But I have no intention, at
least in this article, of defending the Warren Court against the particular
indictments brought by Professor Kurland. For somewhere argument must
end and resolve itself into a genuine search for understanding, and it would
be desirable for legal scholars and political scientists to undertake such a
task jointly within the framework of interdisciplinary research.
NEEDED:

A

CHANGE IN PERSPECTIVE

In the following pages I shall try to establish a basis for reorienting our
thinking about the Supreme Court and go on to suggest a heuristic model
that, it is hoped, would tend to deepen our appreciation of the role of the
Supreme Court in American society and politics. I will use the Kurland
article as my point of departure, since the intellectual and methodological
problems embedded in that essay are not atypical of much current writing
on the Supreme Court. But it is time now to strive for a level of analysis,
other than that embedded in the tendentious literature mentioned above,
by studying the Court in terms of its activity within a context that transcends
the legal order as the lawyer might define it. It is time to look at the Supreme
8

SCHUBERT, CONSTrTUTIONAL POLITICS (1960).
9 Kurland, supra note 4, at 175.
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Court as an existential reality, to see it for what it is and has been in American political experience, rather than for what it ought to be, and to treat the
values motivating Supreme Court behavior as objective data interacting with
other forces, demands, and processes.
The legal scholar who would concern himself with the broad role of the
Court in our society must realize that the vicissitudes of American politics
impose unavoidable limits upon the coherence, unity, and predictability of
constitutional doctrine. Indeed, it is safe to say that the Court's creativity,
paradoxically, is to be found precisely in those political limitations which
circumscribe the exercise of federal judicial power. For, within the context
of Supreme Court litigation, doctrine (law) and politics collide with
splintering impact, giving to the Court the leverage and freedom it needs to
fashion solutions to complicated questions of public policy as they are
brought in focus by particular cases.
But political science also needs much more research on the Supreme
Court considered in sociopoliticalcontext. For today the research is fairly
well dominated by judicial behavioralists who, it must be said, have contributed enormously to our understanding of the judicial process. The
judicial behavioralist's interest, however, has centered on the conduct of
individual Justices. This research deserves to be supplemented by studies
which give greater attention to the Court as a corporate institution, viewed
both historically and contemporaneously with respect to its interplay with
various social forces, interests, and units of government. After all of our
work on the Supreme Court, we are still badly in need of accurate and
systematic descriptions of the Court's relation to these factors. Above all,
we must seek to avoid the subjectivism that is associated with our personal
reactions to particular decisions.
For example, Professor Kurland's major criticism of the Court is that the
Justices are guilty of a notorious lack of judicial self-restraint. But in making
the charge he gives us little hint as to what are the limits of judicial power.
He is at a loss to define these limits because it is impossible to do so with
any degree of precision. Indeed, we are left in doubt as to the specific
ground of his objections. Is Professor Kurland quarreling with the results of
certain Supreme Court decisions, or with the grounds of those decisions, or
both? Is he arguing on behalf of the application of neutral principles a la
Professor Wechsler,' 0 or for the invocation of those passive virtues 1 -- or
vices,12 depending, of course, on your point of view-described by Profes10 See Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 H~Av.
L. REv. 1 (1959).
11 See Bickel, Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 Hiv. L. Rnv. 40 (1960).
For a more extended treatment of this theme, see BIcKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS
BRANCH (1962).
12 See Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues"-A Comment on
Principleand Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. Rnv. 1 (1964).
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sor Bickel? Or is he simply suggesting that certain areas of American public
policy ought to be free of judicial oversight? Perhaps all these elements are
embodied in his sally against the Court. The point is that we do not seem to
get very far in accumulating systematic knowledge about the behavior of
the Supreme Court by focusing on questions like these, which inevitably
involve the application of highly subjective standards.
Then we are faced with the possibility of having constitutional law, in
Kurland's words, "turned back to the political scientists."'11 This statement
is by no means clear. One wonders what is meant by the term "turned
back." When did lawyers or legal scholars recapturethe domain of constitutional law? When were the political scientists in charge? Under Marshall?
Taney? Chase? Waite? Taft? Hughes? Stone? Vinson? Is the behavior of
the Warren Court really any different from the behavior of these other
regimes? Was any one regime any more political than ony other? If so, by
what criteria? Is the answer to be found in Professor Kurland's charge that
the Warren Court has "wrought more fundamental changes in the political
and legal structure of the United States than during any similar span of time
since the Marshall Court had the unique opportunity to express itself on a
tabula rasa"?14 But many of these political and legal, not to mention social,
structures, such as racial segregation, were originally ratified and legitimated
by the Supreme Court. Was the Court acting less politically then? Why
should the process of ratification or legitimation be regarded as intrinsically
less political than the process of nullification or reversal?
Consider also the hyperbolic assertion that the Court will continue to
play the role of the "omniscient and strive toward omnipotence" so long as
the "true measure of the Court's work is quantitative [that is, the concern of
the statesman and political scientist] and not qualitative [that is, the concern
of the judge and the legal scholar]."'u Again, it is hard to interpret the
precise meaning of this reproof. Is the problem that of the Court being more
concerned with results than with reasoning? Or does Professor Kurland
simply disagree with the results of certain Supreme Court decisions, regardless of the reasons marshaled in support of them? Is his difficulty that of
finding constitutional justification for certain Court decisions? Or, despite
constitutional justification, ought the Court have refrained from deciding
certain controversies as a matter of propriety, or out of deference to the
political branches of government?
Perhaps it is Professor Kurland and not the political scientists or the
Court who is putting too much stress on quantity. The number of new
rulings, overrulings, and fundamental changes in the law would not seem
to be as important as the ratio of such rulings to social change. The activity
13 Kurland, supra note 4, at 175.
14 Kurland, supra note 4, at 143.
15 Kurland, supra note 4, at 175.
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of the modem Court may have much to do with the fact that social and
technological change in the last two decades has gone forward at a very
rapid pace, representing geometric rather than arithmetic progression, and
is not to be compared with the proportionately slower rate of change between Marshall and Vinson. We are living in a period of great upheaval,
requiring reassessment of our living habits, social relations, and political
institutions. The revolutions we are witnessing today in science and technology are more than matched by the social revolutions occurring in the
United States and in the world, the major thrust of which is toward greater
personal and collective security, equality of opportunity, and freedom of
individual choice and maneuver. One can take notice of the inexorability
of this historical trend without necessarily being committed to value-oriented
jurisprudence. But a question arises; is the Court a prime mover of events,
as Professor Kurland believes, and obviously deplores, or is the Court
being carried along in the current of events? Or, are we witnessing a creative
interaction between law and social process? These are questions which
Professor Kurland and his intellectual supporters have not even begun to
investigate, yet these questions must be probed if Felix S. Cohen was
correct in his judgment:
A truly realistic theory of judicial decisions must conceive
every decision as something more than an expression of individual personality, as concomitantly and even more importantly
a function of social forces, that is to say, as a product of social
determinants and an index of social consequences. A judicial
decision is a social event. Like the enactment of a Federal statute,
or the equipping of police cars with radios, a judicial decision is
an intersection of social forces: Behind the decision are social
forces that play upon it to give it a resultant momentum and direction; beyond the decision are human activities affected by it. The
decision is without significant social dimensions when it is reviewed simply at the moment in which it is rendered. Only by
probing behind the decision to the forces which it reflects, or
projecting beyond the decision the lines of its force upon the
future, do we come to an understanding of the meaning of the
decision itself. 16
It is this dimension of Supreme Court decision-making that Professor
Kurland and many other critics of the Court's conduct singularly ignore.
LAW AND SOCIAL SCIENCE

A legalistic view of constitutional law simply cannot account for the
powerful sociopolitical forces buffeting our society today. Professor
Kurland's own special fondness for neutral principles of constitutional law,
16 COHEN, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM.
L. REv. 809, 843 (1935), in THE LEGAL CONSCIENCE: SELECTED PAPERS OF FELIX
S. COHEN 33 (L. Cohen ed. 1960).
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which would not take sides between clashing ideologies, raises the ugly
head of slot-machine jurisprudence. Apparently, Professor Kurland cannot
bear the thought of uncertainty in law. One has to marvel at the stubborn
tenacity and persistence of a mechanistic theory of law which holds that the
Justices are not involved in politics, but are above politics as they labor to
resolve controversy through the dispassionate application of neutral and
deductive principles. The real danger of the neutral principles thesis is that
it tends to carry judges into the unreal and heady realm of logomachy, with
the result that human feeling, emotions, and values are taken out of law,
divorcing it from intimate contact with reality, or the hopes and aspirations
of ordinary men. Part of this unrealistic quest for certainty in constitutional
law stems not only from formal training in Anglo-American jurisprudence,
but also from American law's relative estrangement from political and social
science. Professor Kurland's approach is that of the constitutional legalist,
where, at the best, the Supreme Court is viewed as functioning at the fringe
of the political system, not as an essential component of it. And what could
be more uncertain than politics, of which the legal process is an essential
ingredient. Apparently the wisdom of Holmes, Frank, and others has not
yet seeped in: that uncertainty is fundamental to the legal process, and
that the quest for certainty in law is to take flight from adulthood in pursuit
of a childish phantasy.' 7
The problem derives in part from the unfortunate fact that law, as a field
of learning, has grown and been taught in relative isolation from the social
sciences. The legal scholar, for example, has turned his attention inward to a
self-sustaining structure of legal rules, norms, and values. He orbits around
a world of books containing concepts, rules, precedents, and definitions,
the empirical referents of which are often impossible to locate.' 8 Despite
the impact of legal realism upon American jurisprudence, it is still possible
for the law student to graduate at the top of his class without ever having
read a sociological monograph, a treatise in psychology, or an essay in
political dynamics. As Harold Lasswell suggests, it has been the lawyer's
perennial duty to state arguments, to draft briefs, and to put forth a "persuasive interpretation of how a given prescription applies to concrete circumstances."' 9 But legal training which focuses on these objectives seems
17

See FRANK, LAW

AND THE MODERN

MIND 243-60 (1930).

18 Political science has only recently, under the impact of the behavioral revo-

lution in the social sciences, liberated itself from similar intellectual strictures. There
was a time when political scientists roamed about in an abstract world analogous
to Von Jhering's heaven of legal concepts. Only there the fictions or disembodied
spirits in terms of which the real world was all too frequently described were concepts like sovereignty, public interest, majority rule, justice, public opinon, democracy,
and the state. Attention was focused on governmental and constitutional forms, rather
than on the human activity which gave meaning and significance to these forms.
Political scientists ignored life processes, just as legal scholars failed to heed Erlich's
insight that law was the product of social forces and not logic.
19 LASSWELL, TnE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 199 (1963). Lasswell also
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to militate against (1) the development and refinement of causal analysis,
(2) inquiry into "postulated goals of the legal system" considered against
"projections of probable future events," and (3) analysis of courts from
a broad functional perspective, 20 shortcomings which could be overcome
by greater interdisciplinary cooperation between legal scholars and social
scientists.
By contrast, the political scientist has usually turned his attention outward
to the political process where human activity, denominated as political, has
become the subject of study and analysis. 21 This does not mean that legal
rules, constitutional doctrines, or institutional framework are ignored by
contemporary political science. This would be absurd. The tendency of
modern research in political science is rather "to go beyond the data supplied by constitutions, statutes, administrative decrees, or judicial decisions-themselves evidence, directly or indirectly, of political behaviorto a more complete description of governmental structure in action. It seeks
to disclose sets of recurring patterns in the way people behave, involving
relationships of leadership and subordination, functional specialization, and
the like, which are in varying degrees changeable even though relatively
persistent. '22 Under the impact of behavioral research, political science
also has been pressed toward greater interdisciplinary cooperation with the
other social sciences. The modem tendency toward the integration of the
social sciences stems from the salutary realization that knowledge cannot
be compartmentalized without grossly distorting reality. Indeed, the relenotes: "Political scientists who work with legal scholars will discover that the realistic
point of view is by no means universal and that many lawyers who profess to go
along with it are not willing to apply the realistic approach with vigor and constancy
to every problem. Moreover, it cannot be taken for granted that the distinction between syntactics (logic) and semantics is generally understood." Id. at 195.
In this connection we are also reminded of Cardozo's observation: "There is
in each of us a stream of tendency . . . which gives coherence and direction to
thought and action. Judges cannot escape that current any more than other mortals.
All their lives, forces which they do not recognize and cannot name, have been tugging at them-inherited instincts, traditional beliefs, acquired convictions; and the
resultant is an outlook on life, a conception of social needs, a sense in James's phrase
of 'the total push and pressure of the cosmos,' which when reasons are nicely balanced, must determine where choice shall fall." CARnozo, THE NATURE OF THE
JuDIciAL PRocEss 12 (1921).
20 LASSWELL, op. cit. supra note 19, at 193-206.
21 See generally DANELSyu, A SUPREME CouRT Jusrce Is APPOINTED (1964);
PELTASON, FEDEA.L COURTS IN THE PoLrICAL PRocEss (1955); PRrrcHnrr, THE
RoosEvELT COURT: A STUDY IN JUDICIAL POLmCS AND VALUES, 1937-1947 (1958);
SCHMIDHAUSER, THE SUPREME COURT, ITS POLITICS, PERSONALITIES, AND PROCEDURES
(1960); WESTIN, THE ANATOMY OF A CONSTITIONAL LAW CASE (1958). For
excellent collections of articles on this general subject, see MURPHY & PRITcHNTT,
COURTS, JUDGES, AND PoLTIcs (1961); SCHMIDHAUSER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN
TE PoLTcAL PRocEss (1963); SCHUBERT, JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR: A READER IN THEORY
AN]RESEARCH (1964).
22 See Eldersveld, Heard, Huntington, Janowitz, Leiserson, McKean & Truman,
Research in Political Behavior, 46 AM. POL. ScL REV. 1003, 1004 (1952).
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vance of the insights and discoveries of the economist, sociologist, psychologist, and anthropologist for a more proper understanding of political
behavior, as well as the operation of political institutions, has been fairly
well perceived by political scientists.
Yet law has been relatively untouched by the thrust toward interdisciplinary cooperation-to the hindrance of both social science and law-and
legal scholars are not usually found in the company of social scientists,
though there are fresh signs that this is beginning to change. 23 An exception

to this generalization are certain legal historians who have tried to uncover
law's explicit relation to extralegal phenomena and to describe systematically the mutually interacting influences of law, politics, economics, and
social processes. 24 But the law-making process is the legitimate concern of
both lawyers and political scientists. "In the most inclusive sense," Harold
Lasswell notes, "jurisprudence is itself a component of political science,"
for it is "particularly concerned with authoritative patterns of decisions."
He then admonishes: "Obviously, decisions may be both authoritative and
controlling; specialists in neither jurisprudence nor political science are
exclusively concerned with one or the other.125 We would, therefore, simply
re-emphasize that the fuller view of law as it relates to the political system
would seem to require joint effort by legal scholars and political scientists.
THE NEW CONCEPTUALISM

Viewing the Court from a broad perspective and within the framework
of larger political context avoids the new conceptualism implicit in much
of the critical commentary on the modern Supreme Court. Unlike the old
conceptualism which imported an excessive rigidity into the meaning of
ambiguous constitutional language, the new conceptualism seeks to limit
23 In recent years, for example, the Social Science Research Council has sponsored summer seminars on the legal process, bringing together legal scholars and
social scientists, who devote several weeks of intensive study to various problems
of law and society from an interdisciplinary point of view. See Kalven & Schwartz,
Administration of the Law of Torts: The 1961 Summer Research Training Institute
on Interrelationsof Law and Other Social Institutions, 14 J. LEGAL ED. 513 (1962).
Another co-operative enterprise between legal scholars and social scientists is the
Center for the Study of Law and Society, established on the Berkeley Campus of
the University of California in 1961. It is just now beginning to produce significant
contributions to our understanding of law's relation to society. See CENTER FOR THE
STUDY OF LAW AND SocETY ANN. REP. (1963-1964). Another hopeful beginning
was the recent establishment of the Law and Society Association being supported by
the Russell Sage Foundation. Perhaps one of the most forward-looking developments
in recent years is the addition of social scientists to law school faculties. The Yale
experiment is, of course, well known. Less dramatic moves in this direction have
also been made at Wisconsin and Northwestern.
24 See, e.g., HURST, LAW AND SOCIAL PROCESS IN UNITED STATES HISTORY
(1960). See also HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH-

CENTURY UNITED

STATES

(1956); HURsT, LAW AND EcoNomic GROWTH (1964).

25 LASSWELL, op. cit. supra note 19, at 196.
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the functions of the Court in accordance with narrow and fixed standards
of judicial involvement. The Supreme Court exceeds its proper authority,
according to this theory, if it transcends these fixed and proper limits of
judicial power. This is another variant of legalism on the rampage. This is
not to suggest that judicial power is no different from legislative or executive power, or that the judiciary is a political forum distinguishable from the
legislature only in the number of its personnel. Judicial power is different
because it is exercised within a certain framework of rules, values, and
expectations, and because the remedies it provides are limited.20 But the line
which separates federal judicial power from executive or legislative power
is far from straight; it is a wavering line whose curvatures depend upon the
pressures, exigencies, and necessities of the moment.
One reason for the blurring of these lines is that the founding fathers,
whether they realized it or not, or whether they wanted to or not, placed
the Supreme Court squarely at the center of the American political system.
A major branch of government made coordinate with and independent of
the legislature and the executive, entrusted simultanously with power to
settle controversies between the nation and the states, as well as to hear
cases and controversies arising under the Constitution, federal laws, and
treaties, couldrealistically occupy no other position in American politics,
even barring the practice of judicial review. Chances are that the collection
of practical politicians-or were they lawyers?-who gathered in Philadelphia in 1787 to draft a new constitution actually had little idea of what
the Court would eventually become. As Professor John Roche said in his
brilliant analysis of the constitutional convention:
Drawing on their vast collective political experience, utilizing
every weapon in the politician's arsenal, looking constantly over
their shoulders at their constituents, the delegates put together a
Constitution. It was a makeshift affair; some sticky issues (for
example, the qualification of voters) they ducked entirely; others
they mastered with that ancient instrument of political sagacity,
studied ambiguity (for example, citizenship), and some they just
overlooked. In this last category, I suspect, fell the matter of the
power of the federal courts to determine the constitutionality of
acts of Congress. When the judicial article was formulated
(Article III of the Constitution), deliberations were still in the
stage where the legislature was endowed with broad power under
the Randolph formulation, authority which by its own terms was
scarcely amenable to judicial review. In essence, courts could
hardly determine when ". . . the separate States are incompetent
or . . . the harmony of the United States may be interrupted";

the National Legislature, as critics pointed out, was free to define
its own jurisdiction. Later the definition of legislative authority
was changed into the form we know, a series of stipulated powers,
26 See MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY

12-36 passim (1964).
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but the delegates never seriously reexamined the27 jurisdiction of
the judiciary under this new limited formulation.
In short, the Court would become what it would in operation. And what it
became was an effective and sometimes aggressive instrument of policymaking, interacting with the legislative and executive branches under conditions of constructive or creative tension. Indeed, it is impractical to define
a priori the role of any institution in a viable democracy and changing
society. Just as words derive their import and meaning from usage, an
institution derives its significance from its activity and usefulness.
Worth recalling here also is the fact that the law-making roles of judiciary, legislature, and executive have changed from era to era; the pattern
of interplay between them alters, sometimes drastically, depending upon
the intensity and course of social change, human inertia, and a multitude
of other sociopolitical factors. And it would seem that whether the Court
occasionally takes the lead in conflict resolution, or whether the behavior of
the court conforms to some rigid standard of judicial propriety, is quite
irrelevant so long as the integrity of the entire political system is maintained.
As Alexander Bickel notes:
The functions [separation of powers] cannot and need not be
rigidly compartmentalized. The Court often provokes consideration of the most intricate issues of principle by the other branches,
engaging them in dialogues and "responsive readings"; and there
are times also when the conversation starts at the other end and
is perhaps less polite. Our government consists of discrete institutions, but the effectiveness of the whole depends on their involvement with one another, on their intimacy, even if2 it often is
the sweaty intimacy of creatures locked in combat.
The new conceptualism which seeks to define rather precisely the
perimeters of judicial power is really derived from too legalistic a view of
separation of powers. Professor Kurland looks toward a constitutional
legalism which views the Court solely as an expositor of legal doctrine,
while forgetting that such expositions involve real and difficult choices
among competing political values and interests. Indeed, the new conceptualism envisions a neutral, dispassionate, nonpolitical court, detached from the
frustrations, emotions, and outbursts of our political life, when in actuality
the cases which most frequently go to the Supreme Court reflect the deepest
wounds, grievances, anxieties, and divisions of American society.
THE

SUPREME COURT AND THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY

Much of the criticism currently directed at the Supreme Court stems from
the proposition that the Court is not a democratic institution. Adherents
27

Roche, The Founding Fathers: A Reform Caucus in Action, 55 AM. POL.
812 (1960).
BICKEL, op. cit. supra note 11, at 261.

Scr. REv. 799,
28
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of the new conceptualism in modem jurisprudence see the Court doing
things that the legislature and other popularly elected organs of government
should be doing. Even a realist like Professor Roche concludes that "the
current policy power of the federal judiciary is an anomaly in our democratic system," for it is a "Platonic graft on the democratic process. ' 20 He
perceives a distinct difference between the law-making and law-applying
functions; "it is not the function of judges to determine social and economic
policy: their task is to apply those policies decided upon by the responsible
organs of government to cases at bar."30
This is clearly not the place to describe the nature of democratic representation or the quality of political responsibility in America. But a few
general observations are in order. Many thousands of hours of research and
writing by modem political scientists should by now have established the
fact that the American political process cannot be understood in terms of the
classical theory of democracy. Though public opinion obviously sets limits
to the exercise of political power, the complicated business of governing
this nation on a day-to-day basis and the hammering out of solutions to
hundreds of problems, large and small, are not matters simply of translating
majority will into governmental policy. 1 They are rather a complicated
process of consultation, negotiation, and adjustment between politically
active individuals, vested interests, and various agencies of government.
Anyone who takes the trouble to grasp the reality of modem government
will realize that it is not a neat tapestry woven with logic and embroidered
in constitutional lace, but a tangled ball of thread. Operating beneath the
veneer of formal government organization are multiple and competing
systems and sub-systems of political power, sustained by the services they
provide and the support they receive inside and outside government.8 2 Thus,
government is a series of working relationships between manifold groups in
the electorate and various departments, agencies, and levels of government,
a process which must be taken into account by any viable theory of democratic representation. Democracy conceived populistically simply does not
comport with political reality.88
Obviously, the Supreme Court is not representative in the same sense as is
Congress. But this does not mean that the Court is politically irresponsible
29 RocIm, COURTS AND RIGHTS 105 (1961).

80 Ibid.
81

see

For the most sophisticated treatment of this complex problem of democracy,
PUBLIC OPINION AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 411-531 passim (1963).

KEY,

82 For excellent descriptions of these interrelations, see MONSEN & CANNON,

THE MAKERS OF PUBLIC POLICY: AMERICAN PoWER GROUPS AND THEIR IDEOLOGIES
(1965); TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS 321-498 passim (1955); WILDAVSKY,
THE POLITICS OF THE BUDGETARY PROCESS (1964); ZEIGLER, INTEREST GROUPS IN
AMERICAN SOCIETY 93-232, 249-331 passim (1964). See also STEIN, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIoN AND POLICY DEVELOPMENT 573-848 passim (1952).
3 See DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 34-62 (1956).
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or not representative. The Supreme Court is no more unrepresentative than
the federal bureaucracy, which has also suffered the slings and arrows of
criticism overly influenced by classical democratic theory. The failure to
incorporate all American political institutions into a viable theory of representative democracy derives from the failure to view these institutions in
a wider context of interplay with social forces outside government and with
other government institutions. According to the constitutional legalist, for
example, government agencies do not make policies; they merely carry out
the will of the original policy maker. On the other hand, Norton Long has
argued that the federal bureaucracy is actually more representative of the
people than Congress is. In taking a larger and more functional view than
the constitutional legalist, he states:
The democratic character of the civil service stems from its
origin, income level, and associations. The process of selection of
the civil service, its contacts, milieu, and income level after induction make the civil service as a body a better sample of the mass
of the people than Congress. Lacking a caste system to wall them
off from their fellows, the members of this sample are likely to
be more responsive to the desires and needs of the broad public
than a highly selected slice whose responsiveness is enforced by a
mechanism of elections that frequently places more power in the
hands of campaign-backers than voters. Furthermore, it is unlikely that any overhauling of our system of representation in
Congress will remove the need for supplementary representation
through the bureaucracy. The working interaction of President,
Congress, courts, and the administrative branch makes the constitutional system a going concern-not the legal supremacy of
any one of them.34
And out of this complex web of interrelationships comes something as
closely approximating government for, by, and of the people as can be
expected in a complicated political system operated by selfish and fallible
men. This is one reason why the judicial activist-passivist controversy comes
close to being a rather sterile debate, for it is highly unlikely that an activist
court will seriously affect the balance that obtains among American political
institutions, since the court functions within a complex web of government
whose character is determined far more by the multifarious pressures
brought against it than by any pronunciamento of a single organ of law.
Part of our problem is that we have tended to identify representation with
elections. To be sure, elections are absolutely necessary to democracy, but
may not be entirely sufficient for effective representation. In our political
culture the democratic process is to be identified with the whole complicated
paraphernalia of structures and institutions-economic, social, political, and
legal-which collectively embody the hopes and aspirations of our people,
and by means of which men hope to realize their most ardent desires.
34 LONG,

THE PoLITY 70-71 (1962).
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Democracy has been defined as "a system in which, through compromise,
the competing demands of interests may be satisfied while the decisionmaking mechanisms of government continue to operate." 85 Perhaps a better
definition is that of Anton-Hermann Chroust who has described a working
democracy as "that sum total of social, political, economic, and legal structures-that sum total of the practices of creating, distributing, and balancing
all socially significant values-through which true human worth and true
human individuality may effectively be realized."8 0
For these and many other reasons, the intrusion of democratic theory
into the debate over the role of the Supreme Court in American society can
only becloud the issue. Professor Martin Shapiro suggests that it is better
"to begin with the simple non-ideological proposition that the Supreme
Court is here and is making policy in intimate connection with other parts
of government."8 7 The fact is that any organ of government at any particular point in time is more or less democratic. Whether more or less
depends on the circumstances. In the words of Professor Shapiro:
But so long as the Supreme Court functions within a governmental matrix of mixed democratic and nondemocratic elements,
whether or not to assign certain tasks to the Justices is no more
and no less a question of democracy than whether or not to
assign those tasks to any other government agency. In attempting
to decide the desirability of allocating decision-making power
over labor matters to the Court or to N.L.R.B., for instance, the
relative degree of direct popular control over each may be significant, but it is simply one factor among many. Certainly nothing can be solved by calling down a plague on both their houses
because neither is selected by annual elections. It seems preferable to determine in each separate policy area whether judicial
policy-making contributes to well rounded representation of interests or to popular control more or less than policy-making by
some rival agency. This approach is surely more useful than
issuing blanket condemnations of judicial action on the basis of
an abstract model of democratic policy-making that does not
reflect the realities of American government. 88
It would, indeed, be unfortunate to get ourselves bogged down in a debate
as to which political branch or agency is the representative unit of American
government. Representation is a relative matter. It is so because only in
utopia is there a perfect correspondence between popular will and governmental policy. All agencies and branches of government are representative
only in degree, for each possesses some undemocratic qualities. Each
branch, agency, or unit of government is defined by its own group life, its
85 ZEIGLER, op. cit. supra note 32, at 40.
86 Chroust, Law: Reason, Legalism, and the Judicial Process, 74 ETncs 16

(1963).
37 SHAPiRo, LAW
88 Id. at 46.
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own ritual, its own norms, and its own formal and informal power structures, all tending to limit or deny access or effective representation to some
groups, while answering to the demands of others.
It is normal for groups to resort to the judicial process when they have
been stymied at the hands of the legislature or some other agency of government. The American Negro is an excellent case in point. It is probably
true that a majority of Americans are in favor of desegregating educational
facilities. Yet, this majority sentiment has not been translated into a federal
law by Congress because of an internal power structure which frequently
blocks action. In some states the urban and suburban voters have suffered
a similar fate, simply because the electoral system itself has institutionalized
minority control. Congress is so encumbered by anti-majoritarian devices
and its power so fragmentized that voting majorities are frequently thwarted.
But even with congressional reform and more responsible party government,
certain segments of the American public would still be underrepresented
in Congress. In that event, the response of the underrepresented group is
frequently to the federal judicial process. As Professor Roche noted:
On the theoretical plane I do not consider Supreme Court review
of policy matters to be democratic in character. As a participant
in American society in 1963-somewhat removed from the abstract world of democratic political theory-I am delighted when
the Supreme Court takes action against "bad" policy on whatever
constitutional basis it can establish or invent. In short, I accept
Aristotle's dictum that the essence of political tragedy is for the
good to be opposed in the name of the perfect. Thus, while I
wish with Professors Wechsler and Kurland, inter alios, that
Supreme Court Justices could proceed on the same principles as
British judges, it does not unsettle or irritate me when they behave
like Americans. Had I been a member of the Court in 1954, I
would unhesitatingly have supported the constitutional deathsentence on racial segregation, even though it seems to me that
in a properly ordered democratic society this should be a task for
the legislature. To paraphrase St. Augustine, in this world one
must take his breaks where he finds them. 9
The basis of American democracy is the fragmentation of political power.
Indeed, the constitutional rights of property, contract, free speech, petition,
and assembly legitimate the many independent and competitive centers of
private power, whose interplay constitutes a flourishing social dynamism.
The integrity of this system of power is preserved partially by the fact that
the groups within it can go for protection to any number of official centers
of political power, including the federal courts. Thus, constitutional framework and legal structure dovetail with the extralegal sociopolitical system
to reinforce and vitalize American pluralism.
39 Roche, The Expatriation Cases: "Breathes There the Man, With Soul So
Dead... ?," 1963 SUPREME CouRT REv. 326 n.4 (1963).

246

JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

4

EMORY LAW SCHOOL

The avoidance of concentrated power, the grand purpose of the Constitution, implies that all groups will be effectively represented in the political
system, and that the legitimate exceptions of all major segments of the
public will be at least minimally fulfilled. Circumstances may dictate the
feasibility of resorting to the Supreme Court for redress, but even the Supreme Court is limited by what it can do. For one thing, the Court, as any
other agency of government, operates within a framework of public expectations, while at the same time it functions within a vast judicial bureaucracy
which modulates its rulings, parries its thrusts, and sometimes even openly
defies its mandates. Furthermore, any major social or political achievement
needs the creative collaboration of all branches of government. This is the
real measure of the Court's limitations.
A FUNCTIONAL

APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF THE SUPREME COURT

All these generalizations about the Supreme Court's contribution to
American democracy are speculative propositions, for they have not been
the subject of empirical inquiry. What is needed, therefore, is a theoretical
framework which might help to clarify the Court's role in the political
system. It would seem that a functional approach would furnish an analytical scheme satisfactory for this purpose. But functionalism has not been
used very extensively in political science. There are, of course, many variants of functionalism as developed in the social sciences. 40 Functionalism
as used here, however, would fall somewhere between what Flanagan and
'4
Fogelman call "eclectic functionalism" and "structural functionalism." '
The former lacks significant theoretical content, while the latter is so
abstract in its theoretical formulations that it fails to meet the test of empirical inquiry. In middle-range functional theory the emphasis would be
upon observing the activity of the Supreme Court so as to identify the
sources of its input and the effect, both latent and manifest, of its output.
Such inquiry would be concerned particularly with the effects of this output
upon the Court itself as a corporate institution, as well as upon the political
system. It would study the conditions under which judicial power and
authority are maximized, 42 stabilized, or minimized, since it seeks to eschew
normative questions that deal with the Court's proper role in the society.
40 For example, see its uses in LEvY, THE STRUCTURE OF SOCIETY (1951);
MITCHELL, THE AMERICAN POLITY (1962); PARSONS, THE SOCIAL SYSTEM (1951);

PARSONS, STRUCTURE AND PROCESS IN MODERN SOCIETY pt. III passim (1960). Adler,
Functionalism Made Verifiable, 4 THE SOCIOLOGICAL Q. 59 (1963). For a more

limited use of functionalism see MERTON, SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE
19-84 (rev. ed. 1957). See also FUNCTIONALISM IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (Monograph
5 in a series sponsored by the American Academy of Political and Social Science,

1965).
41

Flanagan & Fogelman, Functionalism in Political Science, in FUNCTIONALISM

IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES, supra note 40, at 112-15.
42 See Murphy's treatment of this problem in MURPHY, op. cit. supra note 26,
at 123-275 passim.
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In the words of Felix S. Cohen, that great and illustrious enemy of "transcendental nonsense" in law, functionalism, "may be defined as the view
that a thing does not have a 'nature' or 'essence' or 'reality' underlying its
manifestations and effects and apart from its relation with other things;
that the nature, essence, or reality of a thing is its manifestations, its effects,
and its relations with other things.14 3 It is necessary to understand the
Court's functions in terms of all its vital contacts with the changing forces
of society.
Functional analysis as used here embraces inquiry into the reasons why
particular interests gain access to the Supreme Court. This requires a perspective which goes beyond the internal decisional process of the Court
itself, that is, one which views the Court as a subsystem within a larger
system of political action. The larger system is moved by friction resulting
from the interplay among interests, events, and institutions, which are the
moving parts of the system; the task of the functionalist is to determine how
and why they relate to each other, and to describe further how each moving
part relates to the operating efficiency of the entire mechanism.
The Supreme Court is, of course, an important political agency, not by
any means the most important political organ in our government, but one
of many units of government engaged, in the words of Lasswell and Kaplan,
in the "shaping, distribution, and exercise of power. '44 Because of the
Court's power of review, its unavoidable involvement in high controversy,
and the fact that it is the final legitimizing authority in the nation where
constitutional questions are concerned, it constitutes a political subsystem
necessarily engaged in, to use Easton's phrase, the "authoritative allocation
of values for a society," 45 a sophisticated way of saying that the Court
wields power.
But what exactly is this power, and what qualities or properties does it
share with political power generally? The first observation we would make
is that power is not a substance capable of being located in the manner of
a gridpoint on a map, but rather a process which describes the relationship
between two or more actors in the political system. A political actor may
refer to an institution or a group, such as the Supreme Court, as well as
to an individual. The momentary equilibrium which exists between actors
in the power system is subject continually to tensions, strains, and disturbances, caused by other forces, which inevitably impinge upon the primary actors, introducing factors which alter the original relationship. This
is what the political process is all about.
With respect to the Supreme Court, the political process is one of transactions between the Court and the forces with which it continually interacts.
43 COHEN,

op. cit. supra note 16, at 47.

44 LASSWELL & KAPLAN, POWER AND SocIETY 75 (1950).
45 EASTON, THE POLITICAL SYSTEM 129 (1959).
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The nature of these transactions may be illustrated by an adaptation of
Easton's model of the political system. 46 According to this model, the Court
is inextricably caught up in a relationship of interdependence with Congress,
the President, administrative agencies, federal courts, and the states-all
of which constitute the official political system-as well as with unofficial
participants in the political system, such as political parties, interest groups,
opinion leaders, the mass media, and certain individuals. The interactions
within and among these groups and units of government frequently take
the form of inputs (court cases) which the Court then converts into outputs
(decisions). Inputs are perceived, according to the model, as the products
of political conflict submitted to the Court for resolution; in that forum
inputs are converted into outputs or decisions, which generate further conflicts in the system. A Supreme Court decision, therefore, does not really
end conflict or quell disturbance. It merely introduces a new component
into the political system, generating new demands and altering the terms
of old conflicts. The political system is likened to a conveyor belt which
feeds conflict into the Court, whose actions are then fed back into the larger
political system to yield additional conflicts ultimately conveyed back to
the Court.
Arthur Bentley also sought to destroy the rarified world of the constitutional legalist when he said: "There is no political process that is not a
balancing of quantity against quantity. There is not a law that is passed
46 See EASTON, A FRAMEWORK FOR POLMCAL ANALYsIS 108-17 (1965). But
Easton is concerned with interactions. He conceptualizes the political system, for
example, "as a set of interactions, abstracted from the totality of social behavior,
through which values are authoritatively allocated for a society." Id. at 57. Though
Easton might deny it, there seem to be certain elements of functionalism implicit
in his concept of systems analysis. In stressing the secondary importance of structure,
he says:
From the point of view of the analysis being developed, structure is definitely secondary, so much so that only incidentally and for illustrative
purposes need discussion of structures be introduced. . . .The assumption
will be that there are certain basic political activities and processes [functions?] characteristic of all political systems even though the structural
forms through which they manifest themselves may and do vary considerably in each place and age. Logically and temporally prior to the examination of such structures, it is vital to explore the processual nature of
these political interactions. This stress on the processes of political interactions lends a dynamic character to political analysis, as we shall see, that
must be absent from any premature and undue emphasis on the forms or
patterning of political behavior.
Id. at 49-50. The point, of course, which Easton makes, and which is implicit in this
article, is that in any political regime certain functions and services must be performed if the system is to achieve that necessary equilibrium essential to social and
political stability. The important thing is the vitality and survival of the system. In
this connection it might be said that in the United States the vitality of the system
depends upon an effective system of representation to which the Supreme Court is
contributing. That the Supreme Court is so contributing is not as important as that
the activities be performed.
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that is not the expression of force and force in tension. There is not a court
' 47
decision or an executive act that is not the result of the same process.
Hence, it is essentially activity which is studied whenever power-including
judicial power-is subjected to analysis. Thus, when one undertakes to
investigate the Court, the appropriate question is not, "What is the nature
of judicial power?" whereupon one then proceeds to interpret the Court's
behavior in terms of that particular Procrustean bed. From a functional
point of view the relevant question is not, "What ought the court to do?"
but rather, "What is it now doing and why?" The behavior of an institution
is determined by political dynamics, not by definitions of the nature of its
power. Only in Plato's Republic do men live by definitions, and the political
system defined there is totally incompatible with the spirit of liberty. As
Martin Shapiro puts it: "The Supreme Court, like other agencies, has different powers and different functions depending upon who wants it to do
what, when, and in conjunction with or opposition to what other agencies
or political forces. If a final answer can ever be offered to the question,
What is the role of the Supreme Court? it will be achieved by correlating
various power and functions in specific 'areas,
rather than by a general
48
examination of the nature of the Court."
Judicial power in the United States is a fact of political life. It can only
be explained by reference to the very rocky, jagged, and circuitous route
it has traversed since its inception in 1789, and to an incredibly flexible
political tradition of mixed values, factional bargaining, and pragmatic
decision-makers who simply did not fret over the particular institutional
source of their power so long as they resorted to an agency of politically
organized society which had the right and capacity to govern. Though our
political theory is jammed with rhetoric about separation of powers, in
practice Americans were no more worried about the niceties of that principle than about articulating the fine line which allegedly divides federal
and state authority. American men of power-whether judges, legislators,
administrators, or interest group leaders-were pragmatists first and constitutional legalists second. Not that they were uninterested in constitutional
theory, nor did they really feel that the Constitution was not on their side.
Indeed, the Constitution has served as a pivot around which much, if not
most, of American political debate has revolved. The great value of the
Constitution is that historically it has served as a powerful myth, available
for mobilization in support of given political goals. The great symbolic
significance of the Constitution was captured in de Tocqueville's astute
States
observation that "scarcely any political question arises in the United
'49
that is not resolved, sooner or later, into a judicial question.
47 BENTLEY, THE PRocEss OF GOVERNMENT:
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American politics has always been a delightful combination of principle,
expediency, and skulduggery. We gave and we took, we compromised here
and made adjustments there, and if the literal language of the Constitution
had to be reinterpreted to fit the occasion, we had ways of doing that also.
Harold Lasswell was probably correct in defining politics as "who gets
what, when, [and] how."50 It is in this complicated and twisted process of
decision-making that we locate perhaps the genius of the American political
system, and even the basis of our freedom.
CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court today is an embattled institution. It is so because it
has assumed an active role in a period of rapid political and social change.
But if we are to understand the role of the Court in our society we must
give more systematic attention to its actual operations in the political system
before defining its place in our scheme of government. Professor Kurland's
essay, which prompted this article, fails to do this. Yet, his article cannot
be dismissed since it may well represent a new and perhaps rising genre
of critical commentary originating, for the most part, in the nation's leading
law schools. It represents the beginning of a new conceptualism which
tends to inhibit our understanding of the dynamics of government.
The difficulty arises in part from the continued estrangement of law from
political science, and partially from the failure of political scientists to
fashion tools, techniques, and concepts designed to answer many of the
problems raised in the present essay. The legal scholar needs to change his
perspective, while the political scientist might commit himself more fully
to a functional approach to the study of the Supreme Court. It is the major
conclusion of this article that such modest alterations in perspective and
emphasis would lead to increased understanding of the role and functions
of the Supreme Court in the American system of government.
50 LASSWELL, PoLmcs: WHO GETS WHAT, WHEN, How (1958).

